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Abstract 
This study investigates the association between proprietary costs and the quality of 
financial reporting. Interpreting a firm’s financial reporting policy as a choice of 
precision (“quality”) for the disclosed accounting earnings, I find evidence that the higher 
the proprietary costs, the lower the precision (“quality”) of reported accounting earnings. 
This is consistent with analytical work in disclosure theory which suggests that, ceteris 
paribus, as the proprietary cost of disclosure increases, the quality of disclosure 
decreases. 
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1. Introduction 
This study investigates factors associated with the cross-sectional variation in the 
quality of financial reporting. Throughout this paper, I interpret a firm’s choice of   
financial reporting policy as one that achieves a certain precision level (“quality”) for the 
reported accounting earnings in compliance with Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP). The “quality” of reported earnings is interpreted as the degree to 
which these accounting numbers more accurately represent the underlying economic 
fundamentals of the firm and to which extent they map into operating cash flow 
realizations.1 Therefore, reported earnings of higher quality are defined as earnings that 
better predict future operating cash flows.  
 The ability to predict future cash flows has been a concern of the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), as it is reflected in its Statement of Financial 
Concepts No. 1, Objectives of Financial Reporting by Business Enterprises (1978), 
paragraph 37.2 In addition, the FASB claims that earnings and its components are better 
indicators of future cash flows than current cash flows (FASB [1978] paragraph 44).3 
The analysis in the paper is based on the assumption that firm’s managers posses 
superior knowledge and information regarding their firm’s performance relative to 
outside parties. As predicted by economic theory, reducing such information asymmetries 
can be beneficial for firms in terms of improved valuation and reduced cost of capital. 
Therefore, by providing information that enhances the ability of investors and other 
financial information users to better predict future cash flows, firms can reduce these 
misvaluations. However, there are also costs associated with disseminating proprietary 
information. For example, providing financial information of higher quality can result in 
                                                 
1 For example, this is consistent with Mikhail et al. (2003) definition of earnings quality. They define it as 
(p. 1)  “the extent to which a firm’s past earnings are associated with its future operating cash flows.” The 
term ‘earnings quality’ is vague and has different interpretations. Some users of financial statements will 
use the term in the context of accounting conservatism. Another interpretation focuses on persistence, 
where earnings of higher quality are sustainable and persist into the future. A more general interpretation of 
the persistence idea is suggested by tying earnings quality with predictability, claiming that earnings of 
higher quality are a good indicator of future earnings. 
2Paragraph 37 states: “…[F]inancial reporting should provide information to help present and potential 
investors and creditors and other users in assessing the amounts, timing, and uncertainty of prospective 
cash receipts…..Thus, financial reporting should provide information to help investors, creditors, and 
others assess the amounts, timing, and uncertainty of prospective net cash inflows to the related enterprise.” 
3Paragraph 44 states: “[ I]nformation about enterprise earnings and its components measured by accrual 
accounting generally provides a better indication of enterprise performance than information about current 
cash receipts and payments.” 
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competitive disadvantages in the product market. Thus, firms will consider this trade-off 
when making decisions that affect the quality of their reported earnings and thus the 
predictability of future cash flows. In light of the above, the purpose of this study is to 
investigate the association between proprietary costs and the predictability of future cash 
flows and to examine whether proprietary costs constrain the quality of reported earnings. 
While the theory that relates the level and/or quality of disclosure and the potential 
valuation benefits (e.g., a lower cost of capital) and the proprietary costs (e.g., third party 
concerns, especially those regarding a competitive disadvantage from disclosing 
information to the product market and regulators) is compelling, empirical evidence on 
this trade-off is scarce (see the survey article of Healy and Palepu [2001]). Harris (1998), 
Shin (2001), and Piotroski (2001) are examples of empirical studies that investigate the 
proprietary costs associated with managers’ disclosure decisions.4 Harris and Piotroski 
focus on the firm’s segment disclosure reporting decision, whereas Shin investigates the 
relation between product market competition and voluntary disclosure. 
 One of the major limitations of empirical studies on voluntary corporate 
disclosure is the difficulty in measuring both the level and quality of disclosure policies 
(Healy and Palepu [2001]). Because measuring disclosure is difficult, some studies focus 
only on management forecasts (e.g., Coller and Yohn [1997], Pownall, Wasley, and 
Waymire [1993]). Others examine disclosure ratings, for example Lang and Lundholm 
(1996), Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999), Welker (1995). The Association of Investment 
Management and Research (hereafter, AIMR) rankings that are often used by researchers 
are subjective and noisy measures of disclosure quality.  
As a complementary approach to previous empirical studies that focus on 
disclosure quality, this study focuses on the quality of reported earnings as an 
interpretation of a firm’s disclosure choice. Given this interpretation, I capture a broader 
aspect of the disclosure policy decision compared to previous empirical studies. By doing 
so, I provide a link between the quality of accounting information, as interpreted by its 
precision, and the relative proprietary costs related to such a disclosure policy decision.  
                                                 
4 There are other studies that investigate the association between disclosure decisions and proprietary costs, 
but they are very context-specific. For example, Scott (1994) uses as a proxy for proprietary costs strike 
incidences and other labor associated variables when examining how these proprietary costs are associated 
with pension disclosures of Canadian firms. 
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 The results of this study suggest that the higher the proprietary costs, (as proxied 
by realized margins, capital intensity, and industry concentration), the lower the quality 
of earnings and thus the ability to accurately predict future cash flows. These results hold 
both in a pooled and a firm-specific analysis. In particular, the findings suggest that the 
less competitive is the industry, the more difficult it is to predict future cash flows. The 
tenor of my results is consistent with previous empirical studies, specifically Harris 
(1998) and Piotroski (2001). The results of this study extend the findings of earlier 
studies that focused only on specific disclosure decisions, for example segment 
disclosures, rather than examining the firms’ overall disclosure policy decision. 
This study contributes to the accounting literature in several aspects. First, I 
suggest a link between a firm’s financial disclosure reporting policy and the proprietary 
costs associated with such a decision. Specifically, I interpret the disclosure policy as a 
choice of precision for the disclosed accounting earnings which affects the ability to 
accurately predict future operating cash flows. This approach complements previous 
empirical studies that used different measures of disclosure levels/quality. Second, by 
identifying the proprietary costs associated with the cross-sectional variation in cash flow 
predictability, I provide evidence on some of the factors that partly account for this cross-
sectional variation. This extends our understanding of why firms do not provide financial 
information of the highest quality. 
Section 2 of this study provides a literature review and presents the theoretical 
background on the association between proprietary costs and disclosures decisions. 
Section 3 describes the hypothesis development and the empirical model. Section 4 
presents the sample selection criteria and provides descriptive statistics. Empirical results 
and additional analyses are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes and presents 
directions for future research. 
2. Relation to prior research 
Several studies, both analytical asset pricing models and empirical research, 
investigate the link between levels of disclosure and valuation, focusing generally on the 
firm’s cost of capital. It has been shown that a firm with increased levels of disclosure 
reduces the cost of equity capital that arises from information asymmetries either between 
the firm and its stockholders, or between potential traders in the firm’s shares. Examples 
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of theoretical work in this area are Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985), and Diamond and Verrecchia (1991). Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) suggest 
that higher disclosure reduces the amount of information revealed by a large trade in a 
firm’s securities, thus reducing the negative price impact that is associated with such 
large trades. In this scenario, investors would have larger positions in a particular firm’s 
securities; there would be a higher demand for the firm’s securities, which increases the 
price of the firm’s stock, thus reducing the cost of equity capital.   
 Empirical work by Amihud and Mendelson (1986) shows that the cost of equity 
capital is higher for stocks with a higher bid-ask spread because investors demand to be 
compensated for the added transaction costs. The authors suggest that firms that provide 
more private information can reduce the adverse selection component of the bid-ask 
spread and thus reduce their cost of equity capital.  
In an empirical study, Botosan (1997) claims that higher disclosure enhances 
stock market liquidity, which reduces the cost of equity capital either through reduced 
transaction costs or increased demand for the firm’s stocks. She finds that for 
manufacturing firms that have low security analyst following, there is a negative 
association between a self-constructed index of disclosure level and the cost of equity 
capital. It had also been found that firms providing additional segment disclosures have 
an increase in the market’s capitalization of their earnings, which is consistent with 
having a lower cost of equity capital (Healy and Palepu [2001]).  
In a related empirical study that examines disclosures policies, Sengupta (1998) 
provides evidence similar to Botosan’s (1997) results for the cost of the firm’s debt. 
Similar to other empirical studies on disclosure policies (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 
[1993], and Healy, Hutton and Palepu [1999]), Sengupta (1998) uses AIMR scores as a 
measure of disclosure quality. He shows that firms with higher AIMR scores have a 
lower interest cost of issuing debt. Welker (1995) finds that firms with higher levels of 
disclosure have lower information asymmetry as proxied by bid-ask spreads. Healy, 
Hutton and Palepu (1999) find that firms with sustained improvements in analysts’ 
ratings of disclosure quality (AIMR scores), experience increase in stock liquidity, 
analyst following, institutional ownership, and stock performance. Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2000) show that German firms adopting a high-quality reporting regime by switching to 
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international reporting standards exhibit lower information asymmetry, as reflected by 
lower bid-ask spreads and higher trading volume. 
In addition to the literature that investigates the benefits associated with 
disclosure strategies, a complementary branch of analytical research examines the costs, 
especially the proprietary ones, associated with disclosure decisions. Models such as Dye 
(1985, 1986), Verrecchia (1983, 1990), Darrough and Stoughton (1990), Wagenhofer 
(1990), and Hayes and Lundholm (1996), show that, all things equal, the probability of 
disclosure decreases as the associated proprietary costs increase. Some of these 
proprietary costs are mainly third party constraints – firms bear the costs of competitive 
disadvantage from disclosing information to their competitors and regulators, bargaining 
disadvantages with both suppliers and consumers, and litigation that might follow 
informative disclosure.5 
As Fields et al. (2001) point out, both the Botosan (1997) and Sengupta (1998) 
studies, although providing interesting empirical insights, suffer from some deficiencies. 
A major deficiency identified by the authors is that the analysis presented in these studies 
does not consider what the related costs of higher disclosure quality are. This claim, 
among others, motivates examining the cost side of disclosure policy choices. 
In an analytical study, Wagenhofer (1990) suggests that on the one hand, the firm 
wishes to maximize its market value, but on the other hand, it wishes to deter entry of a 
potential competitor and to incur minimum political costs (i.e., regulatory related costs). 
Wagenhofer shows that although there is always a full-disclosure equilibrium, there 
might exist partial-disclosure equilibria, which depend on the information to be disclosed, 
the level of political costs, and the probability that a competitor will enter the product 
market. Baiman and Verrecchia (1996) consider a model in which both the costs and 
benefits of disclosure are taken into consideration. They show that there exists a trade-
off, for example, more disclosure reduces the cost of capital but also reduces the 
manager’s profits from inside trading. 
 Addressing some of the concerns raised in Fields et al. (2001) regarding the costs 
associated with disclosure choices, Harris (1998) and Piotroski (2001) are examples of 
empirical studies that investigate the effects of proprietary costs on disclosure levels, 
                                                 
5 Other costs related to disclosure are the costs of developing and presenting financial information. 
Although these costs should not be ignored, I focus mainly on third party related costs. 
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examining only one dimension of the disclosure decision – discretionary segment 
disclosure. Whereas Harris (1998) focuses only on the cost side, Piotroski (2001) 
examines also valuation benefits related to segment disclosure reporting. Harris (1998) 
examines the effect of competition on a firm’s segment disclosure decision and finds that 
in industries that are less competitive, segment disclosure is less likely to occur. Harris’ 
(1998) disclosure measure, a binary variable measuring a decision to use segment 
reporting, captures only a specific type of firms that prefer this specific channel of 
disclosure among the set available to the firm. As Shin (2001) correctly points out, 
focusing only on segment disclosure as a medium of disclosure has some limitations. For 
example, firms that focus only on one product do not have much discretion regarding the 
disclosure of information, impairing a segment disclosure decision as accurately 
representing a voluntary disclosure decision. 
While Botosan and Harris (2000) focus on how frequently firms disclose segment 
information, Piotroski (2001), using a self-constructed measure of disclosure, focuses on 
the fineness-coarseness dimension of the segment disclosure decision. He finds that 
segment reporting fineness is negatively related to proprietary cost factors and positively 
related to variables that proxy for potential valuation benefits from increased disclosure.  
Shin (2001) is the only empirical study I am aware to date that tests empirically 
the effect of the nature of product market competition on the levels of voluntary 
disclosure. Shin does not examine other proprietary costs associated with disclosure, such 
as a potential threat of future competition, and political costs that affect disclosure 
decisions. He finds that the level of voluntary disclosure depends on the strategic 
interaction setting in the product market: capacity competition drives firms to disclose 
more, whereas price competition drives firms to disclose less. Although this paper 
presents interesting results and explicitly investigates the effects of product market 
competition on firms’ voluntary disclosures, the voluntary disclosure levels are measured 
by the AIMR scores, which as previously mentioned, introduce noise and measurement 
errors in the research design which make the results difficult to generalize. Furthermore, 
Shin examines only a specific type of proprietary cost which is related to current product 
market competition, without focusing on other proprietary costs such as vulnerability of 
existing firms to future competition. 
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3. Hypothesis development and empirical model 
3.1 Factors Determining Cash Flow Predictability  
One of the factors that determine the ability to accurately predict a firm’s future 
cash flows is the quality of the financial information disclosed by the firm. Focusing on 
an informational perspective, the financial statements provide only a portion of the total 
value-relevant information necessarily to predict a firm’s future performance. Given its 
significant portion in the information mix, I focus on the precision of the accounting 
information disclosed in the financial reports as an important ingredient in enhancing the 
ability to accurately predict the firm’s cash flows. I assume that the choice of earnings 
precision is not determined exogenously; it is rather a choice variable for the firm which 
affects the predictability of future cash flows.6 
 By analyzing the objective function of the firm, both benefits and costs associated 
with the precision of the accounting numbers reported by the firm can be identified. 
Valuation benefits stem from the fact that a firms’ decision to provide a high level of 
disclosure could decrease information asymmetries between managers and investors, and 
within investors and thus lower the cost of issuing equity capital and debt.  
On the other hand, given that there is a potential threat of a competitor entering 
the product market, or the existing competitors may use the proprietary information 
against the firm, managers will be reluctant to provide information of high quality. 
Providing such information increases the likelihood of a potential entry or helps the 
existing competitors in the product market. If the proprietary costs outweigh the market 
valuation benefits, the firm will commit to provide a lower quality of disaggregated 
earnings, which will be less informative and will impair the ability to accurately predict 
future cash flows. I conjecture that the level of cash flow predictability given the quality 
of earnings is negatively associated with proprietary cost proxies. 
 
 
                                                 
6 A different interpretation of this observation is that managers’ choice of earnings precision is some kind 
of earnings management, specifically smoothing earnings over time. Trueman and Titman (1988) explore 
conditions under which firms will choose to smooth earnings to increase their precision (i.e., lower their 
variance). They claim that by smoothing earnings, managers are able to reduce the estimate of various 
claimants of the firm about the volatility of its earnings process, which lowers their assessment of the 
probability of bankruptcy. This is thought to be beneficial for the firm since it lowers the firm’s cost of 
borrowing.  
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3.2 Proprietary Costs 
 Were there no economic forces preventing firms from fully disclosing information 
and/or providing information of the highest quality, we would expect firms, given the 
benefits of higher quality of disclosure, to choose to provide the highest quality of 
financial information. As has been suggested by Fields et al. (2001), this is not the case 
and there are some costs involved. Therefore, when investigating the factors determining 
a firm’s reporting strategy decision, the associated costs, especially the proprietary ones, 
have to be taken in consideration.7 
As analytical work suggests, firms’ decisions to provide information to capital 
markets participants take in consideration that such information might affect their 
competitive position in the product markets (for example, Dye [1985,1986], Verrecchia 
[1983], Darrough and Stoughton [1990], Wagenhofer [1990], Newman and Sansing 
[1993], Gigler [1994], Baiman and Verrecchia [1996], Hayes and Lundholm [1996]). 
Given the presence of competitors and the likelihood of potential entrants to the product 
market, there are proprietary costs involved in the decision to disclose information. 
Although extensive theoretical models address the relation between the nature of 
competition in the product market and disclosure decisions, the predictions are mixed. 
For example, if managers can protect excess profits by not providing information, then 
following Hayes and Lundholm (1996), if higher margins are more likely to occur in less 
competitive settings, then their model predicts less disclosure in less competitive 
industries. On the other hand, some theoretical models such as Newman and Sansing 
(1993) and Gigler (1994) show that the levels of disclosure may increase as proprietary 
costs are higher when managers can report untruthfully.  
Proprietary costs are not the only factors that influence a firm’s decision regarding 
the quality of its financial information and level of future cash flow predictability. As 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) claim, firms, especially large ones, may be concerned 
about potential political costs that may arise from non-disclosure, which affects the 
reporting decision strategy. It is likely that political concerns, as reflected in expected 
future regulatory intervention, creates incentives to make the stream of reported earnings 
as less volatile as possible, which translates in a better ability to predict the future 
                                                 
7 There exist other costs associated with both increasing and decreasing disclosure, for example litigation 
costs, which I do not explicitly address in this current version of the study. 
 9
performance of a firm. Therefore, large firms will have an incentive to reduce the 
variability of reported earnings, thus implicitly enhancing the ability to accurately predict 
its future cash flows. 
To summarize, higher precision of financial information increases the ability to 
accurately predict the future performance of the firm. Information of higher quality 
decreases the barriers to entry in the product market and thus has an adverse effect on the 
incumbent firm. This leads to the prediction that the level of predictability is negatively 
associated with propriety costs. As a caveat, it is important to point out, that I do not draw 
any predictions regarding causality, but test and make predictions regarding the 
associations between two observed phenomena. 
3.3 Proxies for proprietary costs 
Firms that are more profitable and have higher gross margins attract future 
competition and face higher threats of potential entrants. Thus, the proprietary cost of 
providing a higher level of future predictability is expected to increase as the firm’s 
profitability, captured by its gross margin, is higher. Therefore, I conjecture that firms 
that have higher gross margins have lower levels/quality of disclosure which lead to a 
lower level of predictability. MARGIN is defined as sales revenue net of cost of goods 
sold, scaled by net sales.  
If the barriers to entry to a product market are relatively high, the associated 
proprietary costs of disclosure should be lower. High capital intensity is generally 
interpreted as a major barrier of entry. Therefore, capital intensity is thought to be 
positively associated with the ability to accurately predict future cash flows. High entry 
costs to a market, as reflected by high capital requirements, create situations in which a 
large fraction of the capital costs are already sunk for the incumbent firms, but are still 
funds that have not been spent yet by the potential entrants. In order to capture the feature 
of capital intensity as a barrier to entry, the variable CAPITAL is used, which equals net 
property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets. I use this stock variable, instead of a 
flow variable such as capital expenditures, since I believe that it better captures the idea 
of capital intensity of a firm. 
 As a market is more innovative and relies more heavily on intangible knowledge, 
a firm should invest more in retaining its unique status and preserve future opportunities. 
Given that these future opportunities are positively associated with proprietary costs, I 
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expect that GROWTH, which equals the current year’s percentage change in sales, 
proxies for future opportunities that the firm needs to protect, will be negatively 
associated with the level of future predictability.  
 An interesting empirically testable question is how exactly does the nature of 
competition in the product market affect the decision to provide information of high 
quality. Theoretical models provide different predictions regarding this issue. For 
example, Dye (1985) presents a model in which firms may be concerned about whether 
and how their proprietary information is disclosed in their financial reports. If potential 
competitors’ decisions to enter the product market are determined in part by the 
proprietary information provided by the incumbent firm in its financial statements, 
managers of those firms will be reluctant to release proprietary information that may 
affect their firm’s future earnings prospects.8 
Verrecchia (1983) suggests that competition in the product market discourages 
full disclosure, whereas Darrough and Stoughton (1990) reach almost the opposite 
conclusion. Verrecchia (1983), identifying an exogenous cost of disclosure, focuses on 
post-entry competition, when firms in a particular industry are already competing, and the 
current competitors might adversely use the information provided. Darrough and 
Stoughton (1990), on the other hand, identifying an endogenous cost of disclosure, focus 
on pre-entry competition, when a potential entrant is concerned whether to enter the 
product market or not. To try and capture these different notions of competition, I 
measure the concentration rate of each industry by using the HERFINDAHL-
HIRSCHMAN INDEX. I calculate the HERFINDAHL-HIRSCHMAN INDEX 
as ∑= =n 1i i 2]Ss[1H , where si  is the firm’s sales, S is the sum of sales for all firms in the 
industry (defined by the 2-digit SIC code), 
S
si  is the market share of firm i, and n is the 
number of firms in the industry. This index takes into account the relative size and 
distribution of the firms in a market and approaches zero when a market consists of a 
large number of firms of relatively equal size (a situation close to perfect competition). 
The index increases both as the number of firms in the market decreases and as the 
                                                 
8 As Dye (1985) points out, there may be other interpretation to the accounting choice model presented in 
his paper. Firms may be concerned about the possible reactions of other third parties entities to its financial 
reports, such as labor unions, suppliers of inputs, governmental agencies, and other regulators. 
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disparity in size between those firms increases. The higher the index, the higher the 
potential for the exercise of market power.  
On the one hand, it should be noticed that a higher concentration ratio proxies for 
monopoly rents. On the other hand, this may be one of the reasons why the industry is 
highly concentrated. Thus, the concentration ratio might be a proxy for high entry costs 
(high barriers to entry). Given the controversy among different analytical models, I do 
not have a specific prediction on the association between the level of current competition 
as captured by the concentration ratio and the level of future cash flows predictability. 
 Firms will be willing to provide high quality information if they have any 
concerns about potential political costs (Watts and Zimmerman [1986]) associated with 
providing low quality information. This leads to hypothesize that earnings quality (that is, 
predictability of future cash flows) is positively associated with expected political costs. I 
use firm size as a proxy for political costs, and expect a positive relation between size and 
the level of predictability. The size proxy is defined as the natural logarithm of market 
value of equity; I use the natural logarithm of market value in order to capture 
nonlinearities between my empirical measure of predictability and firm size. Although 
the size variable is used as a proxy for political costs, size has been identified through the 
literature as positively associated with disclosure policies. Given the empirical evidence 
on this association, the exclusion of this variable from the regression equations will 
impair the interpretation of the results. 
 I include the firm’s market-to-book ratio as a control variable in order to capture 
the extent to which firms’ financial statements are informative about the underlying 
business (Tasker [1998]). The firm’s market-to-book ratio can be interpreted also as a 
proxy for growth opportunities (e.g. Barth et al. [2001b]). In the context of this study, it is 
expected that firms with greater growth opportunities have greater proprietary costs. 
Under both interpretations of the firm’s market-to-book ratio, I expect that a higher ratio 
will be associated with a lower level of cash flow predictability. For completeness, it 
should be noticed that there exist other interpretations of the market-to-book ratio, for 
example as a proxy for accounting conservatism. This introduces a limitation in the sense 
that market-to-book ratios might not reflect variation in financial statement 
informativeness. For example, if the accounting numbers are very precise and accurate 
but conservative, a firm might have a high market-to-book ratio, and yet its accounting 
 12
information would be very informative regarding the underlying economics of the firm. 
Therefore, this works against finding a negative relation between the market-to-book 
ratio and cash flow predictability as previously suggested. 
3.4 Empirical model 
3.4.1 Measuring the Level of Cash Flow Predictability 
I am considering the following simple setting: managers of a firm, who have an 
objective to maximize the expected value of their firm, commit to a certain level of 
precision for their earnings report before issuing its shares publicly, and release an 
audited annual earnings report, at date t-1. Aggregate earnings for period (t-1) and its 
components, i.e., cash flow from operations and accruals, are used by various parties 
(e.g., capital markets participants and product market current and future competitors) to 
predict the future cash flows of the firm, i.e., cash flows at time t, t+1, etc. 
 Analytical models (e.g., Admati and Pleiderer [2000] and Baiman and Verrecchia 
[1996]) focus on the precision of the information provided as a measure of its quality. 
The precision thus characterizes the quality of disclosure chosen by the firm’s managers, 
and is interpreted as achieving a certain level of predictability of expected future cash 
flows under the flexibility and discretion permitted by GAAP. Thus, the higher the 
precision, the higher the quality of earnings components, which translates in a more 
accurate prediction of future cash flows.    
To measure the level of future predictability empirically, I use two empirical 
measures. The first one is the absolute value of the residuals obtained from a pooled 
regression of future operating cash flows on previous period earnings components, i.e., 
cash flow from operations and accruals. The second measure uses the standard deviation 
of the residuals obtained from a firm-specific time-series analysis.  
The absolute value of the residuals and its standard deviation reflect the 
magnitude of future operating cash flows unrelated to current disaggregated earnings. In 
the empirical analysis that follows, the absolute value of the residuals and their standard 
deviation are the measures of disaggregated earnings ability to accurately predict future 
cash flows, where lower absolute value and standard deviation represents higher quality 
of earnings, and higher level of cash flow predictability. The use of the second empirical 
measure is motivated by analytical models (Holthausen and Verrecchia [1988]) that 
suggest that the variance of earnings forecast errors from a time-series model (which 
 13
corresponds to cash flows forecast errors in the context of this study), is one way to 
interpret the precision of some kind for the information about a firm’s cash flows. While I 
believe that my attempt to interpret the analytical models in terms of empirically 
measured proxies is a valid interpretation, other interpretations such as earnings 
smoothing over time (Trueman and Titman [1988]) are possible and valid as well.  
Motivated by previous studies which show that disaggregating earnings into its 
components (Fairfield et al. [1996]), and in particular disaggregating accruals into major 
components (Barth et al. [2001a]), the measure of earnings quality focuses on the 
residuals obtained from estimating the model specified in equation (1).9 In the pooled 
analysis the focus is on the absolute value of the residuals ( |e| 1t,i + ), whereas in the time 
series firm specific specification, the measure of a firm’s earnings quality is the standard 
deviation of the residuals (σ ei ) obtained from estimating the following model:
10 
ε ++ +β+β+∆β+∆β+∆β+β+α= 1t,it,i6t,i5t,i4t,i3t,i2t,i101t,i OTHERDEPRAPINVARCFOCFO          (1) 
where: 
CFO t,i   = Cash flow from operations for firm i at year t (Compustat item #308); 
AR t,i∆   = Change in accounts receivable account (Compustat item #2); 
INV t,i∆  = Change in inventory account (Compustat item #3); 
AP t,i∆   = Change in accounts payable account (Compustat item #70) plus accrued   
      expenses (Compustat item #153); 
DEPR t,i  = Depreciation and Amortization Expense (Compustat item #14); 
OTHER t,i    = Net of all other accruals, calculated as EARN – (CFO+∆AR+∆ INV- 
   ∆AP-DEPR); 
ε +1t,i   = Error term assumed to have zero mean and constant variance. 
All variables are deflated by average total assets. 
The pooled specification assumes homogeneity across firms and time, 
constraining the coefficients to be the same for all firms and across time. A part of this 
                                                 
9 In section 5, I provide an analysis where the dependent variable is cash flow from operations for (t+2), 
and (t+3). 
10 This specification is used because it has the highest predictive ability compared to models that include 
multiple lags of CF and ACCRUALS components. As Barth et al. (2001) report, this specification has a 
significantly more predictive ability than up to four years of lag variables. 
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assumption is relaxed in the firm-specific time series analysis, which allows earnings 
quality to vary in the cross-section, but it still assumes that a firm’s level of predictability 
is constant over the estimation period. In the firm-specific regressions using annual data, 
I require a minimum of 10 observations for each firm to derive the standard deviation of 
residuals. This requirement is likely to introduce a survivorship bias into the final sample, 
which impairs the ability to generalize the results for young and small firms. 
3.4.2 Future Cash Flow Predictability  
An important concern relates to the fact that there may be important industry 
differences across firms. For example, the ability to accurately predict future cash flows 
may differ by industry, implying that all else equal, there will be differences in the 
predictability level of future cash flows for firms in different industries. To control for 
industry differences in future predictability, I use as the dependent variable, industry 
adjusted measures, to capture a firm-specific empirical measure.  
Differences across firms could influence the predictability of future cash flows. 
Dechow, Kothari and Watts (1998) show that the predictive ability of earnings for future 
cash flows depends on the firm’s operating cash cycle. Dechow and Dichev (2001) claim 
that longer operating cycles induce more uncertainty, making accruals noisier and less 
helpful in predicting future cash flows. To examine whether the association between the 
predictive ability of disaggregated earnings and proxies for proprietary costs is robust to 
controlling for operating cycle, I include in equation (2a) the variable OC, operating 
cycle where OC = 
)360/COGS(
2/)INVINV(
)360/Sales(
2/)ARAR( 1tt1tt −− +++ , and is measured in days. Therefore, I 
include the operating cycle variable in the analysis to capture variation in future cash 
flow predictability that is not associated with the proprietary cost proxies included in the 
empirical specification. 
Taken together with the proprietary cost proxies identified in the previous section, 
the following pooled cross-section and time-series specification is estimated:     
             
++++++=+ 1|| ,5,4,3,2,101, HGROWTHCAPITALMARGINSIZEe titititititi φφφφφφ            (2a) 
              ξ+φ+φ+ +BK_MKTOC t,i7 1t,it,i6  
where: 
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|| 1,e ti +  = Industry adjusted absolute value of residuals obtained from estimating 
equation (1); 
SIZE t,i  = Natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year  
 (year t), calculated as the closing price at fiscal year-end times the number 
of shares outstanding at fiscal year-end (Compustat item #199 times 
Compustat item #25); 
MARGIN t,i  = Gross margin percentage, calculated as the year t net sales (Compustat  
item #12) less cost of goods sold for the year (Compustat item #41), scaled  
by net sales; 
CAPITAL t,i   = Net plant, property and equipment (Compustat item #8) divided by total  
assets (Compustat item #6). 
GROWTH t,i  = Current year’s growth in sales, calculated as net sales for year t  
  (Compustat item #12) less net sales of year t-1, scaled by net sales for year  
  t-1; 
1H t,i   = The Herfindahl Index is calculated as the sum of squares of market  
  shares in the industry. ∑= =n 1i i 2]Ss[1H , where si is the firm’s sales and S  
  is the sum of sales for all firms in the industry (defined by the 2-digit SIC  
  code), and n is the number of firms in the industry; 
OC t,i   = Operating Cycle for firm i at time t, measured in days as 
)360/COGS(
2/)INVINV(
)360/Sales(
2/)ARAR( 1tt1tt −− +++ , where AR is the firm’s accounts 
receivable, and INV is the firm’s inventory; 
BK_MKT t,i  = Market-to-Book ratio, where market value of equity is calculated as the  
closing price at fiscal year-end times the number of shares outstanding at  
fiscal year-end (Compustat item #199 times Compustat item #25), divided 
by the book value of common equity (Compustat item #60). 
ξ +1t,i   = Error term assumed to have zero mean and constant variance. 
 In the firm-specific time series analysis, equation (2b) is estimated. In equation 
(2b), the dependent variable is the standard deviation of the residuals obtained from 
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estimating equation (1) for each firm in the sample. The explanatory variables are defined 
as in equation (2a), but are averaged across time for each firm: 
+φ+φ+φ+φ+φ=σ GROWTHCAPITALMARGINSIZE i4i3i2i10ei                        (2b) 
   ξ+φ+φ+φ+ ii7i6t,i5 BK_MKTOC1H     
4. Data and Sample Selection 
4.1 Sample Selection 
Table 1 summarizes the sample selection criteria. The data are from the 2000 
Compustat annual industrial and research files and spans the 1987-2000 period. Previous 
studies (e.g. Collins and Hribar [2000], Dechow, Kothari, and Watts [1998]) document 
and discuss that deriving cash flow from operations from balance sheet accounts leads to 
potential problems such as noisy and biased estimates. The cash flow from operations 
reported in the statement of cash flows following SFAS No. 95 is likely to have less 
measurement error. Therefore, I limit my attention to this specific period since cash flow 
from operations (Compustat item #308) calculated from the statement of cash flows are 
only available starting in 1987, following Statement of Financial Accounting Standard 
No. 95 (SFAS No.95).11 The earnings number used in the analysis is Compustat item #18, 
earnings before extraordinary items. 
I exclude all the firms that belong to SIC codes 6000-6999 (financial institutions, 
insurance, and real estate companies) since the cash flow predictability empirical model 
developed does not reflect their activities. Next, I restrict the analysis to firms that have 
non-missing data for assets, earnings, and cash flow form operations. I also exclude 
observations with sales less than $10 million, share price less than $1, and the most 
extreme one percent of cash flow from operations and earnings. This reduces the sample 
by 37,724 firm-year observations from an initial figure of 93,354 firm-year observations. 
In addition, I require firms to have at least one year of past and future cash flows, since in 
the first stage of the empirical analysis the dependent variable is future cash flow from 
operations. These criteria yield a primary sample of 32,745 firm-year observations, 
representing 5,845 firms.  
 
                                                 
11 SFAS No.95 requires firms to present a statement for fiscal years ending after July 15, 1988. Some firms 
early-adopted SFAS No.95, so my sample begins in 1987. This sample selection is consistent with Barth et 
al. (2001).  
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4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the first stage of the 
analysis (equation (1)). Consistent with prior studies (Barth et al. [2001a], and Sloan 
[1996]) the means and medians of earnings and cash flow from operations are positive, 
and those of total accruals, which are the difference between earnings and cash flow from 
operations, are negative. Mean and median of total accruals are negative since they 
include depreciation and amortization. The table also reveals that current accruals such as 
the change in accounts receivable and inventory are smaller in magnitude and are more 
volatile than depreciation, which is a long-term accrual. These findings are consistent 
with prior studies, e.g., Sloan (1996). 
Table 3 provides Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman (below the 
diagonal) correlations between the variables used in estimating equation (1).12 EARN 
which is earnings before extraordinary items (Compustat item #18), is significantly (at a 
1% significance level) positively correlated with both ACCRUALS and CFO, where 
CFO is cash flow from operating activities (Compustat item #308), and ACCRUALS is 
the difference between EARN and CFO. ACCRUALS and CFO are significantly (at a 1% 
significance level) negatively correlated. The accrual components are significantly 
correlated with both EARN and CFO, and in general they are also correlated with each 
other. The correlations among the variables presented in Table 3 are consistent with those 
presented in Table 1 Panel B of Barth et al. (2001a).  
 Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the second stage of 
the analysis. The variable OC, operating cycle, has a mean of 145 days and a standard 
deviation of 112 days. This indicates that the majority of the firms in the sample have an 
operating cycle of less than one year. This finding is consistent with the fact that most 
accruals reverse within one year (Dechow and Dichev [2001]). The sample consists of 
sizable firms with average market value of $959 million and a median of $149 million. 
The mean (median) of H1 (the concentration ratio) is 0.25 (0.15), indicating that the 
sample represents rather competitive industries, but with large variation across the 
sample. 
 
                                                 
12 Although EARN is not used directly in estimating equation (1), it is included in Table 3 to provide 
consistency with prior research. 
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5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Deriving the Empirical Measure of Predictability of Future Cash Flows 
 Table 5 presents regression summary statistics for estimating equation (1), which 
is estimated over time and across firms in order to obtain the residuals that are used as the 
empirical measure of the ability to accurately predict future cash flow from operations: 
ε ++ +β+β+∆β+∆β+∆β+β+α= 1t,it,i6t,i5t,i4t,i3t,i2t,i101t,i OTHERDEPRAPINVARCFOCFO          (1) 
This procedure replicates the main model presented in Barth et al. (2001a). Consistent 
with their results, the accrual components in equation (1) and current operating cash 
flows are all significantly different from zero and have predicted signs. All the 
explanatory variables, with the exception of AP∆ , have a positive sign. Given the time 
structure of equation (1), where one of the independent variables is a lag variable of the 
dependent variable, I control for the apparent autocorrelation by using the Yule-Walker 
method for first-order autocorrelation. The correction procedure does not affect 
significantly the t-statistics, and the previous inferences still hold. 
Table 6 presents Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman (below the diagonal) 
correlation among the variables that are used to explain the variation in cash flow 
predictability. As expected, the level of predictability, as measured by |e| 1t,i + ), the 
absolute value of the residuals obtained from estimating equation (1), is significantly and 
positively correlated with MARGIN, GROWTH and OC. On the other hand, |e| 1t,i + ), is 
significantly negatively correlated with SIZE and CAPITAL. Consistent with some 
theoretical predictions, the level of competition, as captured by the concentration ratio 
H1, is positively associated with deficiencies in predicting future operating cash flows 
accurately. This suggests that the higher the concentration ratio, the less competitive the 
industry is and the higher the likelihood that competitors can engage in anti-competitive 
activity, the lower the ability to accurately predict future cash flows. This result is 
inconsistent with disclosure models that predict that firms respond to higher levels of 
competition by providing less information, e.g., Verrecchia (1983).  
The univariate analysis suggests that the level of future cash flow predictability, 
as empirically measured by |e| 1t,i + , and different proxies of proprietary costs are 
negatively associated, implying that the higher the proprietary costs proxies, the lower the 
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ability to accurately predict future cash flows, based on the disaggregated earnings 
components as disclosed in the firm’s financial reports.  
5.2 Results: Cross-Sectional Determinants of Future Cash Flow Predictability 
Focusing on a multivariate analysis, Table 7 presents the results from estimating 
equation (2a), where the dependent variable is the industry adjusted absolute value of the 
residuals obtained from estimating equation (1).  As with the first stage estimation, the 
analysis is based on a pooled cross-section and time-series regression. The results in 
Column A are consistent with the predictions regarding the negative association between 
proprietary cost proxies and cross-sectional differences in the level of future cash flows 
predictability.  
The variables MARGIN, GROWTH, and OC display significant (at 1% 
significance level) positive relation with |e| 1t,i + , while CAPITAL and SIZE have a 
significant negative relation with |e| 1t,i + . These findings suggest that larger and more 
capital intensive firms are providing financial information that predicts future cash flows 
with a higher precision. One interpretation of this finding is that firm size, as well as 
capital intensity, can act as a barrier to entry for future competitors in the product market. 
Therefore, such firms incur less proprietary costs in providing financial information, as 
reflected in the reported disaggregated earnings which are more informative regarding 
their future performance. It is important to point out that the negative coefficient on SIZE 
is consistent with different interpretations, such as a political cost interpretation. A larger 
firm prefers to provide more informative financial information anticipating that the 
likelihood of incurring political costs increases by not choosing such a reporting strategy.  
An additional interpretation of firm size is that it proxies for the firm’s 
information environment, where these results indicate that the larger the firm is, the more 
accurately one can predict its future cash flows. This is consistent with previous research 
documenting a positive relation between firm size and disclosure policy decisions (e.g., 
Lang and Lundholm [1993]). Another interpretation for the observed sign on the size 
coefficient is that there are some firm characteristics omitted from the model that are 
related to the quality of a firm’s accounting numbers, such as that larger firms are 
followed by more analysts. 
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 The significant coefficient on MARGIN implies that firms that are more 
profitable (as reflected in higher realized margins) have higher proprietary costs that are 
associated with a lower level of predictability. The positive significant coefficient on H1, 
which captures the level of competition within a particular industry (the level of 
concentration), is consistent with the interpretation of the positive coefficient of 
MARGIN, i.e., in less competitive industries, the lower the quality of financial 
information. In other words, in more competitive environments, higher quality of 
financial information prevails. These results are consistent with theory models predicting 
less disclosure in less competitive markets (e.g., Hayes and Lundholm [1996]). The tenor 
of the results presented is consistent with empirical studies examining the relation 
between segment disclosures and proprietary costs associated with product market 
competition and other proprietary cost proxies, such as Harris (1998) and Piotroski 
(2001).  
Taken together, the results suggest that firms with higher proprietary costs 
provide accounting information of lower quality, i.e. earnings with lower precision, after 
controlling for variability in future predictability which is not related to proprietary costs. 
5.3 Firm-Specific Analysis 
 In this section I present results from estimating equation (1) in firm-specific time-
series regressions. This methodology relaxes the assumption that constrains the relation 
between future cash flows and disaggregated earnings to be the same for all firms. In the 
first stage, equation (1) is estimated for each firm that has more than 10 annual 
observations. This requirement reduces the number of firms included in the analysis to 
1,255. Having obtained the residuals from estimating equation (1), I calculate for each 
firm the standard deviation of these residuals (σei ).σei  is the empirical measure of 
earnings precision, and is interpreted as the ability to accurately predict future operating 
cash flows, where a higher standard deviation suggests lower predictability. In the second 
stage, equation (2b) is estimated in a cross-section, where for each firm the explanatory 
variables were averaged across time.  
 
+φ+φ+φ+φ+φ=σ GROWTHCAPITALMARGINSIZE i4i3i2i10ei                        (2b) 
  ξ+φ+φ+φ+ ii7i6t,i5 BK_MKTOC1H     
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Table 8 presents the results of the firm-specific analysis. Column A and B report 
the results of estimating equation (2b) which are consistent with the overall relations 
observed in the pooled analysis.  
5.4 Additional Analyses  
 The findings thus far are based on predicting one-year-ahead cash flows, whereas 
prior research predicts cash flows for future periods as well. To examine the ability of 
current disaggregated earnings to predict cash flows more than one year ahead, I repeat 
the analysis by estimating equation (1) and use CF 2t+  and CF 3t+ as the dependent 
variable.   
 Table 9 presents the findings for repeating the pooled analysis. The results 
suggest that the proprietary cost proxies are all significant in explaining the variation in 
cash flow predictability more than one year ahead. OC is not significant, as observed in 
Column B. This is not quite surprising given the fact that descriptive statistics on the 
operating cycle suggest that the majority of the firms in the sample have an operating 
cycle of less than one year, which is consistent with the fact that most accruals reverse 
within one year.  
 Table 10 reports the results for the firm-specific analysis, where the dependent 
variable is the standard deviation of the residuals obtained from predicting cash flows 
two and three periods ahead. Although there is a decrease in explanatory power as the 
prediction horizon increases, the results are in general consistent with the previous 
analysis. The coefficient on OC is not significant as in the pooled analysis, and the 
interpretation is as before. 
6. Summary, Conclusions, and Future Research 
Analytical models of disclosure suggest that firms consider the costs associated 
with providing proprietary information, predicting that such disclosures can damage the 
firm’s competitive position in the product market (e.g., Dye [1985, 1986], Verrecchia 
[1983], Darrough and Stoughton [1990], and Wagenhofer [1990]). This has been referred 
to as the proprietary cost hypothesis throughout the accounting literature (Healy and 
Palepu [2001]).   
Although the theoretical work in this field has been extensive, empirical evidence 
on the proprietary cost hypothesis has been provided only for specific disclosure contexts 
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(e.g., segment reporting and voluntary disclosures). Interpreting the firm’s disclosure 
decision as a choice of precision for the disclosed accounting earnings that affects future 
performance predictability, this paper provides evidence on the association between 
proprietary cost proxies and the ability to predict future cash flows. In a sample that spans 
1987-2000, cash flow predictability is shown to be negatively associated with proprietary 
cost proxies. Specifically, I find that when the barriers to enter an industry are high, 
suggesting that proprietary costs are lower, the level of predictability of cash flows is 
higher. When the firm needs to protect future assets and firm specific future 
opportunities, proprietary costs are high and the predictability of future cash flows is low.  
 Assuming that the competition in the product market is among existing firms, the 
results suggest that less competition, as reflected both in higher realized margins and 
higher concentration ratios, is negatively associated with cash flow predictability. 
There are some limitations to the analysis presented in this study. I did not 
explicitly model and estimate the valuation benefits associated with the ability to predict 
future cash flows, for example how the firm’s cost of capital is associated with cash flow 
predictability, but focused only on the cost side. This is to be done in future work. A 
second limitation is the potential endogeneity problem. A firm might consider the 
expected proprietary costs and/or the expected changes in its cost of capital (or reducing 
its information asymmetry) when it makes its decision regarding its earnings quality. In 
future work, I will include proxies that capture explicitly the valuation benefits from 
increased quality of earnings and I will simultaneously test the relation between the 
ability to accurately predict future cash flows and the valuation benefits and proprietary 
costs. 
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Table 1: Derivation of Sample and Variable Definitions 
 
Panel A: Sample Construction 
 Firm-years Firms 
Firm-years with available 
cash from operations, 
earnings, and total assets in 
COMPUSTAT (1987-2000)  
(excluding financial firms, 
SIC codes 6000-6999) 
93,354 13,342 
Exclude firm-years with 
sales less than $10 Million 
and price less than $1 
(35,269) (3,665) 
Exclude firm-years with the 
most extreme 1% of cash 
from operations, earnings, 
and total assets 
(2,455) (180) 
Exclude firm-years without 
both a lead and a lag value 
of cash from operations 
(9,477) (1,386) 
Exclude firm-years with 
missing values in one of the 
variables used in the first 
stage analysis 
(13,337) (2,266) 
Primary sample used in 
analysis, after deleting firm-
year observations with 
missing values in one of the 
variables. 
32,745 5,845 
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Table 1 – continued 
 
Panel B: Variable Definitions 
EARN Income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations 
(Compustat item#18). 
CFO Net cash flow from operating activities (Compustat item #308)  
ACCRL Total operating accruals, calculated as EARN – CFO. 
∆AR Change in accounts receivable account (Compustat item #2). 
∆ INV Change in inventory account (Compustat item #3). 
∆AP Change in accounts payable account (Compustat item #70) plus accrued 
expenses (Compustat item #153). 
DEPR Depreciation and Amortization Expense (Compustat item #14). 
OTHER Net of all other accruals, calculated as EARN – (CFO+∆AR+∆ INV-
∆AP-DEPR).  
MARGIN Gross margin percentage, calculated as the year t net sales (Compustat 
item #12) less cost of goods sold for the year (Compustat item #41), 
scaled by net sales. 
OC Operating Cycle (in days), calculated as 
)360/COGS(
2/)INVINV(
)360/Sales(
2/)ARAR( 1tt1tt −− +++ . 
CAPITAL Net plant, property and equipment (Compustat item #8) divided by total 
assets (Compustat item #6). 
SIZE Natural logarithm of market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year 
(year t), calculated as the closing price at fiscal year-end times the 
number of shares outstanding at fiscal year-end (Compustat item #199 
times Compustat item#25). 
RD Research and development as a percentage of sales, calculated as year t 
research and development expense (Compustat item #46) scaled by net 
sales (Compustat item #12). 
GROWTH Current year’s growth in sales, calculated as net sales for year t 
(Compustat item #12) less net sales of year t-1, scaled by net sales for 
year t-1. 
MKT_BK Market-to-Book ratio, where market value of equity is calculated as the  
closing price at fiscal year-end times the number of shares outstanding at 
fiscal year-end (Compustat item #199 times Compustat item #25), 
divided by the book value of common equity (Compustat item #60). 
 
H1 The Herfindahl Index is calculated as the sum of squares of market shares 
in the industry. ∑= =n 1i i 2]Ss[1H , where si is the firm’s sales and S is the 
sum of sales for all firms in the industry (defined by the 2-digit SIC 
code), and n is the number of firms in the industry). 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics on Earnings, Cash Flow from Operations, and Accruals, 
Sample of 32,745 Firm-Year Observations, 1987-2000 
 
The table reports descriptive statistics on a sample of 32,745 firm-year observations. EARN is income before extraordinary items (Compustat item #18). CFO is 
cash flow from operations (Compustat item #308). ACCRUALS are total operating accruals, calculated as EARN – CFO. 
∆AR, ∆ INV,∆AP are calculated as the change in the applicable balance sheet account, accounts receivable (Compustat item #2), inventory (Compustat item 
#3), and accounts payable (Compustat item #70) plus accrued expense (Compustat item #153), respectively. DEPR is depreciation and amortization (Compustat 
item #14). OTHER is calculated as EARN – (CFO+∆AR+∆ INV-∆AP-DEPR). 
All of the above variables are scaled by average book value of total assets (Compustat item #6)  
 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev 
EARN 32,745 0.034 0.044 0.120 
CFO  32,745 0.077 0.082 0.110 
ACCRUALS 32,745 -0.043 -0.042 0.109 
∆AR 32,745 0.020 0.011 0.078 
∆ INV 32,745 0.015 0.005 0.069 
∆AP 32,745 0.078 0.068 0.076 
DEPR 32,745 0.049 0.044 0.038 
OTHER 32,745 0.048 0.044 0.104 
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Table 3 
Correlation matrix between variables used in the first stage of empirical analysis 
 
This table reports Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman correlations (below the diagonal). The sample is based on 32,745 firm-year observations. 
EARN is income before extraordinary items (Compustat item #18). CFO is cash flow from operations (Compustat item #308). ACCRUALS are total operating 
accruals, calculated as EARN – CFO. 
∆AR, ∆ INV,∆AP are calculated as the change in the applicable balance sheet account, accounts receivable (Compustat item #2), inventory (Compustat item 
#3), and accounts payable (Compustat item #70) plus accrued expense (Compustat item #153), respectively. DEPR is depreciation and amortization (Compustat 
item #14). OTHER is calculated as EARN – (CFO+∆AR+∆ INV-∆AP-DEPR). 
 
  
 EARN CFO ACCRUALS ∆AR ∆ INV ∆AP DEPR OTHER 
EARN  0.55* 0.54* 0.21* 0.19* -0.001 -0.12* 0.24* 
CFO 0.52*  -0.39* -0.14* -0.21* 0.03* 0.21* -0.09* 
ACCRUALS 0.32* -0.52*  0.36* 0.42* -0.04* -0.35* 0.37* 
∆AR 0.27* -0.12* 0.39*  0.37* 0.41* -0.04 -0.33* 
∆ INV 0.25* -0.18* 0.45* 0.38*  0.32* -0.09* -0.31* 
∆AP 0.11* 0.06* -0.009* 0.32* 0.27*  0.04 0.23* 
DEPR -0.05* 0.29* -0.42* -0.05* -0.10* 0.07*  0.05* 
OTHER 0.09* -0.09* 0.21* -0.21* -0.17* 0.41* 0.05*  
 
* - Significant at 0.01 significance level for testing whether the correlation is different than zero
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics on Level of Predictability, Proprietary Costs Proxies, and Variables used in Second Stage Analysis, 
Sample of 32,745 Firm-Year Observations, 1987-2000 
The table reports descriptive statistics on a sample of 32,745 firm-year observations. RES_ABS is equal to the absolute value of the residuals obtained from 
estimating equation (1). MARGIN is the year t net sales (Compustat item #12) less cost of goods sold for the year (Compustat item #41), scaled by net sales. OC 
(in days) is operating cycle calculated as 
)360/COGS(
2/)INVINV(
)360/Sales(
2/)ARAR( 1tt1tt −− +++ . CAPITAL is Net plant, property and equipment (Compustat item #8) divided by total 
assets (Compustat item #6). SIZE is market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year (year t), calculated as the closing price at fiscal year-end times the number 
of shares outstanding at fiscal year-end (Compustat item #199 times Compustat item#25). MKT_BK is the market-to-book ratio, where market value of equity is 
calculated as the closing price at fiscal year-end times the number of shares outstanding at fiscal year-end (Compustat item #199 times Compustat item #25), 
divided by the book value of common equity (Compustat item #60). GROWTH is current year’s growth in sales, calculated as net sales for year t (Compustat 
item #12) less net sales of year t-1, scaled by net sales for year t-1. H1 is the Herfindahl Index and is calculated as the sum of squares of market shares in the 
industry. ∑= =n 1i i 2]Ss[1H , where si is the firm’s sales and S is the sum of sales for all firms in the industry (defined by the 2-digit SIC code), and n is the 
number of firms in the industry. 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev 
RES_ABS 32,745 0.069 0.043 0.088 
SIZE 32,745 959.021 143.913 2445.051 
MKT_BK 32,745 2.883 1.773 58.263 
MARGIN 32,745 0.344 0.322 0.185 
GROWTH 32,745 0.069 0.082 0.515 
CAPITAL 32,745 0.333 0.275 0.227 
H1 32,745 0.256 0.162 0.255 
OC 32,745 145.652 127.191 112.035 
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Table 5 
Summary Statistics from Regression of Future Cash Flow from Operations on Current Cash Flow from Operations and 
Components of Accruals, Sample of Compustat Firms 1987-2000  
Regression summary statistics: 
 
ε ++ +β+β+∆β+∆β+∆β+β+α= 1t,it,i6t,i5t,i4t,i3t,i2t,i101t,i OTHERDEPRAPINVARCFOCFO                    (1) 
 
Variable Prediction  Coefficient t-statistic 
INTERCEPT ? 0.012 9.49*** 
CFOt  + 0.709 115.09*** 
ARt∆  + 0.396 39.10*** 
INVt∆  + 0.245 22.90*** 
APt∆  - -0.326 -31.3*** 
DEPRt  + 0.442 21.36*** 
OTHERt  ? 0.253 33.61*** 
    
N 32,745   
Adj. 2R  0.32   
*** = two tailed probability<0.01 
 
CFO is cash flow from operations (Compustat item #308).∆AR, ∆ INV,∆AP are calculated as the change in the applicable balance sheet account, accounts 
receivable (Compustat item #2), inventory (Compustat item #3), and accounts payable (Compustat item #70) plus accrued expense (Compustat item #153), 
respectively. DEPR is depreciation and amortization (Compustat item #14). OTHER is calculated as EARN – (CFO+∆AR+∆ INV-∆AP-DEPR). 
All variables are deflated by average total assets. 
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Table 6 
Correlation matrix between explanatory variables used to explain predictability 
 
This table reports Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman correlations (below the diagonal). The sample is based on 32,745 firm-year observations (given 
data availability).  RES_ABS is equal to the absolute value of the residuals obtained from estimating equation (1). MARGIN is gross margin percentage, defined 
as the year t net sales less cost of goods sold, scaled by net sales. CAPITAL is defined as Net plant, property and equipment divided by total assets, and is 
calculated as Compustat item #8 / Compustat item #6. MKT_BK is the market-to-book ratio, where market value of equity is calculated as the closing price at 
fiscal year-end times the number of shares outstanding at fiscal year-end (Compustat item #199 times Compustat item #25), divided by the book value of 
common equity (Compustat item #60). SIZE is market capitalization and is calculated as natural logarithm of the closing price at fiscal year-end times the 
number of shares outstanding at fiscal year-end (Compustat item #199*Compustat item #25). H1 is the Herfindahl Index and is calculated as the sum of squares 
of market shares in the industry. ∑= =n 1i i 2]Ss[1H , where si is the firm’s sales and S is the sum of sales for all firms in the industry (defined by the SIC code), 
and n is the number of firms in the industry. OC is operating cycle (in days), calculated as 
)360/COGS(
2/)INVINV(
)360/Sales(
2/)ARAR( 1tt1tt −− +++ . 
 
  
 RES_ABS MARGIN H1 GROWTH CAPITAL SIZE MKT_BK OC 
RES_ABS  0.06* 0.02* 0.05* -0.22* -0.16* 0.14* 0.06*
MARGIN 0.06* 0.02* 0.02* -0.12* 0.13* 0.016* 0.29*
H1 0.01* 0.02* 0.000 0.05* 0.04* -0.003 0.01**
GROWTH 0.14* 0.10* 0.04* -0.000 0.07* 0.008 -002*
CAPITAL -0.26* -0.16* 0.13* -0.11* 0.21* -0.008 -0.35*
SIZE -0.21* 0.14* 0.06* 0.13* 0.22*  0.008 -0.07*
MKT_BK 0.12* 0.27* 0.05 0.32* -0.08* 0.21* -0.001
OC 0.12* 0.26* 0.19* 0.04* -0.36* -0.10* -0.007
 
*, ** - Significant at 0.01, 0.05 significance level, respectively for testing whether the correlation is different than zero
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Table 7 
Summary statistics from regression of absolute value of residuals from (1) on various factors 
determining variation in cash flow predictability, Sample of Compustat Firms 1987-2000 
 
++++++=+ 1|| ,5,4,3,2,101, HGROWTHCAPITALMARGINSIZEe titititititi φφφφφφ            (2a) 
  ξ+φ+φ+ +BK_MKTOC t,i7 1t,it,i6  
              
Variable Prediction Coefficient 
(t – statistic) 
INTERCEPT ? -2.98 
(-13.08)*** 
SIZE t,i  - -0.11 
(-31.13)*** 
MARGIN t,i  + 0.41 
(10.55)*** 
CAPITAL t,i  - -1.21 
(-36.41)*** 
GROWTH t,i  + 0.13 
(9.52)*** 
BK_MKT t,i  + 0.0002 
(2.24)** 
1H t,i  -/+ 1.50 
(7.71)*** 
OC t,i  + 0.0005 
(8.13)*** 
N  32,676
Adj. 2R   0.29
 
**,*** = two tailed probability<0.05, two tailed probability<0.01 
Column B represents the results of estimating (2a) with industry dummies and year dummies. 
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Table 8 
Summary statistics from regression of standard deviation of residuals on various factors determining 
variation in cash flow predictability, Sample of 1,255 Compustat Firms 1987-2000 
 
(2b) +φ+φ+φ+φ+φ+φ=σ 1HGROWTHCAPITALMARGINSIZE i5i4i3i2i10ei   
          ξ+φ+φ+ BK_MKTOC i7 ii6  
 
 
                                 
Variable Prediction Coefficient 
(t – statistic) 
INTERCEPT ? 0.050 
(20.23)*** 
SIZE t,i  - -0.004 
(-13.16)*** 
MARGIN t,i  + 0.017 
(3.83)*** 
CAPITAL t,i  - -0.032 
(-9.56)*** 
GROWTH t,i
 
+ 0.011 
(1.92)** 
BK_MKT t,i
 
+ 0.0027 
(1.71)* 
1H t,i  -/+ 0.026 
(1.25) 
OC t,i  + 0.00001 
(2.20)** 
N  1,255 
Adj. 2R   0.33 
 
*, **, *** = two tailed probability<0.10, two tailed probability<0.05, two tailed probability<0.01 
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Table 9 
Summary statistics from regression of absolute value of residuals from (1) on various factors 
determining variation in cash flow predictability 
 Sample of Compustat Firms 1987-2000 
 
+++++=+ GROWTHCAPITALMARGINSIZEe titititijti ,4,3,2,10, || φφφφφ       (2a) 
               ξ+φ+φ+φ+ + jt,it,i7t,i6t,i5 BK_MKTOC1H        j=2,3 
              A                           B 
               || 2,e ti +             || 3,e ti +  
Variable Prediction Coefficient 
(t – statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
INTERCEPT ? -2.79 
(-11.95)*** 
-2.65 
(-11.55)*** 
SIZE t,i  - -0.117 
(-27.80)*** 
-0.113 
(-24.06)*** 
MARGIN t,i  + 0.375 
(8.08)*** 
0.484 
(9.04)*** 
CAPITAL t,i  - -0.746 
(-17.08)*** 
-0.645 
(-13.40)*** 
GROWTH t,i  + 0.091 
(5.02)*** 
0.132 
(6.26)*** 
BK_MKT t,i  + 0.007 
(2.74)*** 
0.001 
(3.27)*** 
1H t,i  -/+ 1.12 
(5.27)*** 
1.33 
(5.9)*** 
OC t,i  + 0.0001 
(2.45)*** 
0.00002 
(0.34) 
N  26,834 21,841 
Adj. 2R   0.25 0.18 
**,*** = two tailed probability<0.05, two tailed probability<0.01 
Table 10 
Summary statistics from regression of standard deviation of residuals on various factors determining 
variation in cash flow predictability, Sample of 1,255 Compustat Firms 1987-2000 
 
 +φ+φ+φ+φ+φ=σ + GROWTHCAPITALMARGINSIZE i4i3i2i10e ji        (2b) 
                 ξ+φ+φ+φ+ + jii7i6i5 BK_MKTOC1H                           j=2,3 
 
              A        B     
Variable Prediction Coefficient 
(t – statistic) 
Coefficient 
(t-statistic) 
INTERCEPT ? 0.049 
(13.79)*** 
0.04 
(11.26)*** 
SIZE t,i  - -0.003 
(-7.47)*** 
-0.003 
(-6.91)*** 
MARGIN t,i  + 0.001 
(0.96) 
0.014 
(2.05)** 
CAPITAL t,i  - -0.03 
(-5.27)*** 
-0.026 
(-5.22)*** 
GROWTH t,i
 
+ 0.035 
(4.04)*** 
0.046 
(5.21)*** 
BK_MKT t,i
 
+ 0.006 
(2.64)*** 
0.003 
(1.52) 
1H t,i  -/+ 0.053 
(1.74)* 
0.021 
(1.81)* 
OC t,i  + 0.00001 
(1.06) 
0.00001 
(1.12) 
N  1,255 1,255 
Adj. 2R   0.22 0.19 
 
*, **, *** = two tailed probability<0.10, two tailed probability<0.05, two tailed probability<0.01 
Column A represents the results of estimating (2b) for the prediction of CF 2t+  
Column B represents the results of estimating (2b) for the prediction of CF 3t+  
 
 
 
